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Abstract 
The main hypothesis of this paper is that: in the choice between a moral good of a charitable 
donation, or a self-interested stance of a lottery entry, two observations will be seen: When moral 
identity is positively reinforced through an autobiographical recall task the impact of social 
descriptive norms will be lessened. And moral licensing will occur even when contrary to the 
descriptive norm. When moral identity is negatively affected, socially descriptive norms will 
take precedent and moral cleansing will not be observed. This paper aims to investigate these 
two forces at work in what choice subjects will make. The findings of the experiment were 
contrary to previous studies and showed no effect of moral licensing/cleansing, also no effect of 
descriptive norms were found in this experiment. Self-interest would appear to dominate the 
choice of action in this particular experiment, using the mturk platform. 
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Salient Social Norms vs Prescriptive Moral Norms vs Moral Licensing/Cleansing 
 
 People have a desire to be moral and for a moral self -image (Aquino & Reed, 2002; 
Monin & Miller, 2001). This moral identity and self-image motivates actions that show socially 
responsible behaviours in regard to other people’s needs. This is especially true when it is at the 
top of people’s minds and important to their self-concept, as stated by Reed, Aquino & Levy 
(2007). 
 However even though morality is often in wider society presented as being based upon 
immutable truths, the premise of this paper is that this is not so. Studies have shown that an 
identity’s importance to an individual may change over time, being more salient at specific 
moments (Hart, Atkins, & Ford. 1998), it is not immutable, even with a strong motivation and 
desire to have a moral self-identity moral behaviours have been found to be fluid and 
“malleable” (Jordan, Mullen & Murnighan, 2011, p.11).  
 This paper will focus on the interaction of the various factors affecting this sense and 
salience of moral identity and how that leads to moral/immoral behavior in the real-world 
environment. Critical to this current paper is the fact that a sense of need for moral action and 
identity can be manipulated and is in fact a fluid state. There is much evidence in the literature 
regarding this fluid state of moral identity. Two well researched phenomena in this regard are the 
concepts of Moral Licensing and Moral Self Cleansing (Effron, Cameron & Monin, 2009. 
Merritt, Fein & Savitsky, 2009. Sachdeva, Iliev & Medin, 2009). 
 In short: Moral licensing refers to past moral behaviour leading to an individual feeling 
that they can a certain degree flout moral codes in the future. Whereas Moral cleansing refers to 
past immoral behaviour leading individuals to correct for that and compensate for that in the 
future by performing moral actions. 
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 Previous moral behaviour requires less moral behaviour in the future to complete a sense 
of moral identity so an individual can license, licensing occurs when people have affirmed a 
moral identity and self-image of that identity is high. With previous immoral behaviour requiring 
a moral act in the future to complete a sense of moral identity, so called self-cleansing. This can 
be seen in terms of Self-completion theory (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 2013), where recalling past 
moral or immoral behaviour leads to attempts to complete the moral self in a compensatory 
manner, using Identity relevant symbols or symbolic actions.  
 In a study by Sachdeva et al., (2009), they found that the creation of Autobiographical 
stories using positively valanced words caused individuals to then go on to donate less money to 
charity. With those whose morality was threatened through the creation of negatively valanced 
Autobiographical stories donating more. They propose that: “moral self-worth is one of the 
gauges that indicate when moral action is needed” (Sachdeva et al., 2009, p.523).  
 Another 2009 study relevant to the argument forwarded by this paper is one by Jordan, 
Mullen and Murnighan, they asked subjects to recall a time when they had behaved morally or 
immorally. They then measured for engagement levels with prosocial activities. Those who 
recalled a moral memory were less likely to have an intention to perform a prosocial act than 
those who recalled an immoral memory, who were more likely to report being willing to perform 
a prosocial act. 
 As shall be seen later, relevant to the hypotheses tested in this paper, in terms of a 
consumer’s choice, establishing a pro moral self-concept is likely to lead to a self-indulgent more 
hedonistic choice later (Monin & Miller, 2001), this is an example of a licensing effect where 
individuals feel licensed to choose something that under normal conditions would be to the 
detriment of a moral self-identification. Evidence for this is found in the study by Monin & 
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Miller, (2001) where subjects who imagine themselves doing a prosocial task go on to choose a 
hedonic good over and above a utilitarian purchase. In this current study subjects will be asked to 
choose between a chance to win a lottery or to donate money to a charity, after having taken an 
autobiographical recall task of previous moral and immoral behaviours. 
 So, in the literature evidence is provided of this compensatory behaviour for previous 
moral or immoral action and the fluid nature of moral identity. Past immoral actions 
compensated for by participation in activities that reaffirmed a moral self-image, increasing 
prosocial intentions, with the opposite being true for past moral actions. This effect has been 
observed to be strongest after the consideration of one’s own past behaviour. (Jordan et al., 
2011). 
 These choices carry a strong social identity along with them, and any research needs to 
consider the strong social aspects and heuristics of moral identity. This paper will investigate the 
interaction between morality as a prescriptive norm and morality as a salient social descriptive 
norm , between what one ought to do and what is being done and which process takes precedent 
in moral decision-making processes. 
 In the discussion of moral identity and the moral or immoral choices that arise from it, 
and the strong social component to this identity, it is important to recognize the difference 
between prescriptive and descriptive social norms. There is an efficiency in doing what others do 
in that it lessens the amount of cognitive and effortful resources used in choosing the correct 
course of action in a scenario. Leading to acceptance and conformity. Studies by Cialdini, Reno 
& Kallgren (1990) have investigated the differing effects of descriptive vs prescriptive norms. 
The salience to an individual of a prescriptive or descriptive norm can affect the outcome as to 
which heuristic achieves primacy in the consciousness of an individual. (Cialdini, Reno & 
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Kallgren, 1990). “Distinguishing between injunctive and descriptive norms is crucial, because 
both types can exsist simultaneously in a setting and can have either congruent or contradictory 
implications for behaviour” p.1019 (Cialdini, Kallgren & Reno, 1991) 
 In perhaps a key understanding of Moral self-regulation Sachdeva et al. (2009) found that 
people who had positive and negative traits reinforced changed subsequent moral behaviour 
however they posit that altruistic behaviour is costly to the individual and that there are limiting 
mechanisms to control its manifestation. This coupled with, the already mentioned, increased 
cognitive efficiency of following descriptive norms in everyday life makes for an interesting area 
of study which this paper hopes to elaborate on. Will subjects follow descriptive norms when 
presented with a moral dilemma, or will they hold to the more behaviorally costly moral choice 
of performing an altruistic act and following prescriptive moral norms? 
 Further discussion of moral identity as a form of social identity is needed to pick apart 
this interaction as seen in the literature and as explored in the current experiment. 
 Belonging has been shown to be a strong and fundamental motivation (Baumeister & 
Leary 1995), social inclusion and belongingness are critical to human endeavor. (Bowlby, 1969). 
Moral identity can be fundamental to social relationship and identity and in the creation through 
social relationship of further identity schema (Aquino & Reed II, 2002). “Self-conceptions can 
be organized around moral characteristics...moral identity is another potential social identity that 
may be a part of a person’s social self-schema” (Aquino & Reed II, 2002, p.1424). Morality 
traits have been shown to have greater importance than sociability and competence traits to 
ingroup evaluations. (Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi & Cherubini, 2011). Perceptions of shame, 
social anxiety and depression have been shown to have a relationship to feeling inferior and 
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submissive behaviour, loss of acceptance and approval motivates individuals to use submissive 
strategies (Gilbert, 2000) 
 Indeed a study by Van Dillen, Enter, Peters, van Dijk & Rotteveel (2017), found that 
those primed by a negative moral memory will fixate less on angry eyes than happy or neutral 
eyes. A form of submissive behavior related to possible perceived threat due to a morally 
negative recollection. This past immoral behaviour leads to an awareness of Moral threat which 
elicits a sense that social exclusion is a very real possibility if found out. This is stronger than 
self-interest and leads to submissive behaviours. In contrast people who affirmed themselves due 
to a morally positive recollection showed no significant avoidance of angry faces. 
 So what happens in a situation where socially submissive/dominant behaviours lead to a 
situation which is contrary to the experimental evidence on moral licensing/cleansing? How does 
this interact with moral cleansing/licensing as individual seeks to restore a sense of moral 
balance through a (im)moral act or view point. If a subject has their sense of moral identity 
reinforced through a positive recollection will they avoid the submissive strategy of following a 
descriptive norm? Even if a descriptive norm directs them to donating to a charity will they 
instead choose to play a lottery ? Is the converse also true: a morally negative recollection will 
lead to submissive behaviours and stop an individual from licensing in favour of following a 
social descriptive norm. Will the individual not donate to a charity, but rather play a lottery ? 
 So it can be said that people modulate socially connected behaviour dependent on 
historical behaviour in particular for the purposes of this research in connection with past moral 
or immoral memories, there has been shown to be a connection between the behaviours of other 
people and the moral rationality of an individual and the meaning they subscribe to their own 
behaviours in similar situations (Jordan, & Monin, 2008). This strong social component of 
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moral/immoral behavior bring us to the central argument of this paper over what predominates 
the social aspect or the prescriptive compensatory nature of moral identity. 
 This paper aims to consider and discern under what moral conditions an individual takes 
into account which norms? Aiming to find further insight into: Which is stronger? Fear of social 
exclusion due to infringement/reinforcement of a moral self-identity, or the power of descriptive 
norms of what other people’s behaviour will be. This will be studied by a self-interest vs altruism 
scenario, in this case the possible winning of a lottery entry vs a guaranteed altruistic good in the 
form of a donation to a charity 
Central Research Question of this paper 
 The central research question of this paper is to see the effect of descriptive norms on 
moral licensing and cleansing. To see whether the descriptive norm has more effect than moral 
licensing/cleansing on whether individuals then carry out a moral action. I.e. to test that an 
explicit social norm has more effect than an internal fear/confidence about a prescriptive moral 
norm. Will what should be done in a situation, override, or have no effect when in comparison to 
a salient social cue indicating what is actually being done? Is morality the guiding force or is it 
actual day to day social cues/triggers? 
 Previous research as described has shown that in general people who recall a moral past 
will show licensing. Those recalling an immoral past will show cleansing. However, we expect 
this effect to be modulated by Descriptive/Prescriptive norm interaction and 
submissive/dominant behaviours as follows: 
Hypotheses to be tested: 
 H1: When people recollect a past moral action and both the descriptive and prescriptive 
moral norms are on a charity donation: Subjects will choose a Lotto entry over a charitable 
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donation. Moral Licensing will be observed, and less socially submissive behaviour will be 
observed. 
 H2: When people recollect a past moral action and the prescriptive norm is on a charity 
donation, with no descriptive norm present: Subjects will choose a lotto entry over a charitable 
donation and moral licensing will be observed. 
 H3: When people recollect a past moral action and the descriptive norm is on a lottery 
entry, with the prescriptive norm on a charitable donation: Subjects will choose a lotto entry, 
moral licensing and following social norms will be observed. 
 H4: When people recollect an immoral past action and the descriptive norm and 
prescriptive norm are on a charity donation: Subjects will choose a charity donation and moral 
cleansing and following descriptive norms will be observed. 
 H5: When people recollect an immoral past action and the descriptive norm is on a 
lottery entry with the prescriptive norm on charitable donation: Subjects will choose a lottery 
entry, no moral cleansing will be observed and following descriptive norms and submissive 
behaviour will be observed. 
 H6: When people recollect an immoral past action and the Descriptive and prescriptive 
norm is on charitable donation: Subjects will choose charity donation and moral cleansing will 
be observed. 
 H7: When people recollect a morally neutral past action : Subjects will follow descriptive 
norms primarily when present. 
Method 
Participants and design  
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 We tested 450 subjects, age range 21years to 70 years old, male and female, drawn from 
the user population of the Mturk system (provided by Amazon.com) for online participation and 
collection of data. All subjects were paid the standard hourly rate plus a 50 cents lottery entry or 
charity donation, participant information was processed anonymously and subjects could end 
involvement with the experiment at any time, further to this they were fully debriefed at the end 
of the experiment as to the true nature of the experiment. The study was approved by the ethics 
committee. 
 The experiment had a 3 (recollection: moral, immoral, control) x 3(norm: descriptive 
norm on charity, descriptive norm on lottery, descriptive norm equal on both charity and lottery) 
mixed design. The dependent variable was the amount of a total of 50 cents put into which 
choice of a lottery draw or a charitable donation to UNICEF. To disguise the purpose of the 
experiment the choice of whether to donate to charity or to place money in the lottery was 
introduced as a bonus for having taken part in the experiment. 
Procedure  
The outline of the procedure and summary of the factors/variables of the experiment was as 
follows: 
 Firstly, subjects filled out an informed consent. Secondly subjects were asked to fill in 
demographic information. Thirdly there then followed a survey measuring social anxiety 
followed by a survey measuring self-monitoring. 
 Next Three independent factors were used: Participants were asked to remember a time 
of immoral or moral behaviour, or a morally neutral recollection. Then they were asked to write 
about it briefly. There then followed a filler task (Sachdeva, Iliev & Medin, 2009) a period of 
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answering a series of questions about the emotions experienced in the event recollected, this also 
served to function as a manipulation check.  
 Three independent factors were then used: Matching norms of descriptive and 
prescriptive norms on charity. Mismatching norms of prescriptive norm on charity, descriptive 
on lottery, and a baseline condition of an assumed prescriptive norm for charity. The descriptive 
norm was represented by a jar containing cents showing where most subjects have placed their 
cents. Following this two within subject’s dependent variables were presented: for subjects to put 
some cents as a bet on a lottery, and/or some cents as a donation to charity, this was achieved by 
moving a pile of cents on the computer to a jar for charity donation or lottery entry. 
 Finally, a debriefing was given: participants were informed via email if they had won the 
money or not, and how much was raised for charity at the end of all the subjects being tested, as 
well as being debriefed as to the true purpose of the experiment. 
Materials 
 Social Anxiety/Self-Monitoring survey (These were not material to the hypothesis 
which was tested in this version of the study, and as such are not included in this paper) 
 Moral recollection manipulation and manipulation checks. Subjects were asked to 
remember either an immoral act they had committed in the past (threat condition), or a moral act 
they have committed in the past (affirmation condition), describing emotions felt related to the 
act. In the control condition, they were asked to write in detail about the last time they visited the 
grocery store. (Jordan et al. 2011; Van Dillen, Enter, Peters, van Dijk & Rotteveel, 2016). 
 The instructions for the three conditions were as follows: 
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 For the threat condition subjects were instructed: “Please write in detail about an immoral 
act that you have engaged in in the past. How did it make you feel, and which emotions did you 
experience?” 
 For the affirmation condition subjects were instructed: “Please write in detail about a 
moral act that you have engaged in in the past. How did it make you feel, and which emotions 
did you experience?” 
 For the neutral condition subjects were instructed: “Please write in detail about your last 
visit to the supermarket. How did it make you feel, and which emotions did you experience?” 
(Jordan et al., 2011).  
 To check the strength of the manipulation (moral/immoral/control recollection) and to act 
as a disguise as to the real nature of the experiment, subjects were asked to complete a 7 point 
Likert scale (1= not at all; 7 = very much) measuring the extent to which they felt each of the 
following related emotions: sadness, guilt, disgust, shame, bad feelings about the self, anger, 
fear, happiness, good feelings about the self, pleasure, satisfaction, and pride (Van Dillen et al. 
2017). Further to this, subjects were asked in what time frame the recollection occurred in: 
Recent past 1-4 weeks, medium past 2-6 months, or further past 6 months onwards.  
 Task of proportioning 50 cents. Disguised as a reward for taking part in the experiment, 
this task examined subjects varying degrees of following prescriptive or descriptive norms 
measured through asking them to proportion 50 cents between either a charity donation and/or 
the chance to win a lottery draw.  
 The Instructions were as follows: Thank you for providing us with personal information 
about your past behaviour. To express our gratitude for this, we will give all participants an 
additional $0.50. This $0.50 you may divide between a charity and/or a lottery. When you place 
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money in the lottery, you have a chance of winning an additional $200 dollars, which we will 
pay out after the surveys have been collected. The more money you place in the lottery jar, the 
higher your chances are of winning.  You may also place the money in the charity jar, the content 
of which we will donate to UNICEF after completion of the survey. UNICEF is a world-wide 
operating charity that helps children to obtain healthcare and education. The more money you 
place in the charity jar, the more children UNICEF can help. You can divide the money in 
dimes (10cts coins). 
 Participants were subjected to the following manipulation: a descriptive norm to be 
represented by a full jar showing where “most other subjects had put their money” either on the 
lottery or charity, the prescriptive moral norm is always assumed to be the more moral choice of 
a donation to charity. 
Results 
 48 Subjects were excluded from the analysis due to recognizing the nature of the 
experiment, i.e. if the subject thought that the experiment had to do with whether a lottery entry 
or charitable donation was made, and through incorrectly performing the experiment in terms of 
not doing the moral/immoral/control recollection as instructed. 
Manipulation Checks 
 Multivariate tests revealed a significant effect of moral condition on positive emotions 
experienced (F[8,796]=19.33, p<0.001, np2=0.16). Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD 
test indicated that means for all the positive emotions(happiness, good feeling, pleasure, 
satisfaction, pride) differed significantly between all moral conditions: moral, immoral and 
control, all being significant at the 0.01 level. The moral recollection condition showing more 
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positive emotions than both the immoral and control recollection conditions. (Table 1 provides 
the means and standard errors for both positive and negative emotions in all conditions) 
 Multivariate tests also revealed a significant effect of moral condition on negative 
emotions experienced (F[12,792]=38.35, p<0.001, np2=0.37). Post hoc comparisons using the 
Tukey HSD test indicated that for negative emotions those in the negative moral recollection 
reported significantly more negative emotions for each emotion tested(sadness, guilt, disgust, 
shame, bad feelings, anger, fear) than both the moral condition and control condition, all means 
being significantly different at the 0.01 level, however there was no significant difference 
between the moral and control conditions in the individual negative emotions reported (see Table 
1 for means and standard errors for negative emotions in all conditions).  
Table 1 
Negative and positive emotions (Mean, SD), self-reported on 7-point scales (1=not at all; 
7=very much) as a function of: positive Moral recollection or Immoral recollection or a Neutral 
Control recollection. 
 
 Moral Condition 
Moral Immoral Control 
Positive Emotions    
Happiness 4.69(2.03)a 1.67(1.28)b 3.82(2.04)c 
Good feeling about 
self 
5.57(1.74)a 1.61(1.13)b 3.97(2.07)c 
Pleasure 4.26(2.19)a 1.58(1.24)b 3.54(2.18)c 
Satisfaction 5.39(1.92)a 1.69(1.40)b 4.23(2.29)c 
Pride 5.21(1.89)a 1.38(0.91)b 2.99(1.93)c 
    
Negative Emotions    
Sadness 1.84(1.51)a 3.95(1.89)b 1.52(1.09)a 
Guilt 1.47(1.20)a 5.75(1.40)b 1.32(0.83)a 
Disgust 1.54(1.43)a 3.83(1.98)b 1.53(1.18)a 
Shame 1.38(1.13)a 5.22(1.72)b 1.30(0.96)a 
Bad feelings about 
self 
1.31(0.92)a 5.19(1.78)b 1.57(1.29)a 
Anger 1.62(1.50)a 2.38(1.67)b 1.68(1.34)a 
Fear 1.39(1.05)a 2.60(1.80)b 1.47(1.21)a 
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 Note: means with different subscripts, differ at p < .05 
 
Analysis of Total coins in Charity vs Lottery Jars 
 A two way, between groups analysis of variance was performed. The two independent 
variables were condition of jar (whether jar representation for charity or lottery was empty or 
full) and moral recollection condition (immoral, moral or control recollection). The dependent 
variable was amount of coins placed in the lottery jar. 
 Analysis of variance showed no main effect of jar condition whether full or empty 
(F[2,395]=0.24, p=0.79) on amount of coins placed in the lottery jar. Analysis of variance 
showed no main effect of moral condition(F[2,395]=0.17, p=0.85) on amount of coins placed in 
the lottery jar. Further to this there was also seen to be no significant interaction between jar 
condition and moral recollection condition (F[4,395]=0.99, p=0.41) on amount of coins placed in 
the lottery jar. 
Table 2 
Lottery Jar Means (Mean, SD), as a function of: positive Moral recollection or Immoral 
recollection or a Neutral Control recollection and Jar Condition 
 
 Moral Condition 
Moral Immoral Control 
Jar Condition    
Charity Empty, 
Lottery Full 
4.00(1.62) 3.52(1.56) 3.62(1.50) 
Charity and Lottery 
Empty 
3.55(1.52) 3.51(1.60) 3.78(1.65) 
Charity Full, 
Lottery Empty 
3.36(1.58) 3.72(1.72) 3.69(1.56) 
 In relation to the hypothesis, there was no effect of prescriptive or descriptive norms on 
amount of money donated in any of the conditions. So, no supporting evidence for any of the 
hypotheses was provided by the results to the experiment. Even though the effectiveness of the 
priming of moral condition was in line with previous studies it had no material impact on this 
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study. Nor did the presentation of descriptive norms of how other respondents placed coins in 
jars have any significant effect on behaviour. 
Discussion 
 The data do not provide any supporting evidence for the hypothesis being tested as 
expressed in the introduction, there is no supporting evidence that descriptive norms have an 
impact on donation behavior in relation to a sense of moral integrity. In fact, no evidence of an 
impact of descriptive or prescriptive norms was observed, and no impact of moral integrity was 
observed. 
 This result is contrary to previous studies on moral integrity. The results failed to provide 
supporting evidence for the previous findings of Sachdeva et al. (2009) and Jordan et al. (2009) 
that the creation of negative or positive moral recollections would impact upon levels of 
charitable donations or prosocial action. No evidence of moral licensing or cleansing was 
observed, contrary to one of the fundamental premises of this experiment. Further to this no 
evidence of the impact of descriptive norms on behavior was seen either, contrary to research of 
Cialdini et al. (1990) and Cialdini et al. (1991). And no evidence of socially 
submissive/dominant behaviours was observed contrary to the findings of Van Dillen et al. 
(2017). 
 A critical factor in the failure to replicate and advance on previous findings maybe that 
the Mturk system is primarily used by subjects as a source of income by taking various survey’s 
and taking part in various studies, and this may predispose them to seeking financial 
renumeration during a task. As this is the predominate salient norm they encounter while using 
the online platform. i.e. they are in a mode of thinking in which earning money predominates, 
this may make them more liable to choose the lotto option in this task rather than to make a 
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charitable donation, biasing our results in favour of the lotto outcome. Subjects are already in a 
making money mindset and seek to maximise the financial outcome from taking part in the 
study. This may represent a significant design flaw in Mturk experiments involving money in the 
process and outcomes, as opposed to a study in which subjects are not thinking primarily in 
terms of one of their primary sources of income for the individual. Perhaps this indicates that on 
this platform the prescriptive norm is one of self-interest rather than the supposed norm of a 
moral good and a charitable donation. Perhaps in this sense the results are realistic and indicative 
of actual norms in this environment, so in this sense perhaps the result is accurate and correct, 
Perhaps the prescriptive norm is not as supposed, as seeking a “moral” good, in the basis for the 
hypotheses for this experiment. This may also explain the small but significant effect of SES that 
was found in the study, as different economic classes have different economic outcome 
expectations from taking part in the study. 
 Another possible reason for the non-significant findings of this experiment is that perhaps 
the sense of social identity created was not strong enough due to the anonymous nature of the 
task of apportioning a donation online, where no visibility or feedback was provided on an 
individual’s donation amount. This aspect of “realness” is perhaps critical in tasks regarding 
descriptive and prescriptive norms (Andreoni, 1990. Bateson, Nettle, & Roberts, 2006. Filiz-
Ozbay & Ozbay, 2014. Haley & Fessler, 2005. Locey, & Rachlin, 2015. Nettle, Harper, Kidson, 
Stone, Penton-Voak,, & Bateson, 2013). The informed consent also detailed that responses were 
processed anonymously or in a coded way, this may have given subjects the sense that their 
behavior was not in anyway subject to the normal public nature of moral and immoral actions. 
Indeed, wider society makes much of the potential to be “found out” in regulating, controlling 
and encouraging moral behavior or discouraging immoral behaviour. The effect of this public 
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visibility of moral and immoral actions should be in no way underestimated when considering 
the results of this current experiment. It would be an interesting possibility for an experiment to 
study the difference between moral/immoral behaviours in public domains vs anonymous online 
domains, and to see how prescriptive and descriptive norms instigate behaviours in these 
differing modalities. 
 The realism of the interface for making a donation or lottery entry may also be a factor in 
why the experiment failed to replicate and advance earlier findings. Perhaps the graphics used 
were not conducive to creating the relative realness necessary for descriptive norms to function. 
Perhaps a stronger scenario could be devised for creating a sense of what “others” in the task 
“had done” regarding amount donated or entries into the lotto. Although it was not possible 
within the limitations of the Mturk system a real time feedback into amount of donations or 
lottery entries would give the necessary presence to engage socially descriptive norms in a more 
concrete way. Perhaps using an animated graphic would also increase the realness, this was also 
not possible with the survey software used for the current experiment. 
 Familiarity to the mturk platform may have also led to a superficial processing of the 
visual information presented. And lead to a discounting of the “social” evidence provided by the 
imagery used, having used the platform for many such survey’s and studies subjects maybe 
inclined to lessen mentally the impact of what they are seeing. More novelty in the presenting of 
the preceding survey and the charity donation/lotto option may lead to better engagement with 
the process. And a more animated approach to the donation/lotto entry task may lead to a greater 
sense of realness of the choice. 
 Another possible flaw in the design of the experiment that may be seen in retrospect that 
maybe our charitable appeal was not strong enough. Perhaps in reflection a more empathic 
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appeal could have been generated to trigger prosocial action. And raise the baseline for 
engagement with the appeal. Perhaps in an effort to be as neutral as possible in the wording of 
the charity appeal we lessened the effect. Certainly Coulter & Pinto (1995) provide evidence that 
moderate guilt inducing appeals are more effective than either strong or low guilt inducing 
appeals. Basil, Ridgway, and Basil (2006) have shown that the impact of guilt on charitable 
donations hinges on a feeling of responsibility. They manipulated appeal statements to encourage 
empathy (e.g., “Imagine that you are a child with no home”) showing that empathy is an 
important element in the guilt process. Huhmann & Brotherton (1997), provide evidence that 
combining visual and verbal elements is effective in appeals, our current study relied on a purely 
verbal statement, perhaps a photo of a child we would be helping could have been included, and 
then highlighting a guilt reducing course of action. 
 All in all the preceding mentioned possible reasons may explain why what has been seen 
to be a relatively robust phenomena individually seen in previous studies failed to be replicated 
in the current experiment, which attempted to combine and measure moral licensing/cleansing, 
prescriptive norms and descriptive norms and their varying impact on a donation decision task. 
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Appendices 
Informed Consent  
 The influence of memory recollection on behaviour 
 This study is about the influence of memory recollection on behaviour. This experiment 
will approximately take 20 minutes. We kindly ask you to take the experiment seriously. You 
will receive 1,5 Dollars for your participation.  
 If you have any questions regarding the experiment you can contact Lotte van Dillen 
(dillenlfvan@fsw.leidenuniv.nl) 
 Please read these statements and sign if you understand and agree with them: 
- I have read the information letter for the participant. I could ask additional questions. My 
questions have been answered adequately. I have had sufficient time to decide whether or not I 
participate. 
- I am aware that participation is completely voluntary. I know that I can decide at any moment 
not to participate or to stop. I do not need to provide a reason for that.  
- My responses are processed anonymously or in a coded way.  
- I give consent to use my data for the purposes that are mentioned in the information letter. I 
consent to participating in this study.  
Name of participant: ____________________________ 
Signature: _____________________________________ 
Date: _____/_____/______  
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Debrief 
 Thank you for taking part in this research. 
 The underlying purpose of this experiment was to see the effect of (im)moral 
recollections on prosocial activity and charitable giving. Do people given a choice between a 
moral good (e.g. charitable donation) versus what the majority of people are doing, conform to 
the social expectations/norm or the moral expectation/norm? 
 We portrayed the choice of charity donation/lottery entry as being secondary to the 
research, however this was the key thing we were studying, to determine whether respondents 
would proportion their cents between the charity donation and/or the lottery. 
 To achieve this, we represented the jars of money as indicating that previous subjects of 
the experiment had donated money or put money in the lottery. This was an experimental 
manipulation and not representative of the underlying reality of where people had put the money. 
The jar with more coins in showed an indication of where the behaviour of others would be in 
the same situation, so as to create a sense of social proof as to others behaviour in the same 
situation. 
 Would this be stronger than people’s natural moral inclination to donate to charity? 
Further to this, what effect would asking people to recollect an (im)moral memory have on this 
choice of whether to donate to charity or play the lottery? 
 Previous experimental research has shown that people recollecting a moral event in the 
past are less likely to carry out a prosocial act in the future (in this case a charitable donation). 
People recollecting an immoral event in the past are more likely to carry out a prosocial act in the 
future. 
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 Your contribution to this study is important, and will help to investigate further the 
relationship between morality and socially prompted action. 
 For more information please follow these links to articles on this topic: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-licensing 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Daniel_Effron/publication/227697760_Moral_Self-
Licensing_When_Being_Good_Frees_Us_to_Be_Bad/links/565a41f308ae1ef9297ff5a4.pdf 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/J_Murnighan/publication/50394941_Striving_for_the_Mor
al_Self_The_Effects_of_Recalling_Past_Moral_Actions_on_Future_Moral_Behavior/links/0c96
0525fcfa742f47000000.pdf 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/44197573/van_Dillen_2016_Biol_Psychol_
Moral_Fixations.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A&Expires=148633237
3&Signature=k%2BKz2cQL6y4H%2Bax%2Fh%2Bh8wQ1Obek%3D&response-content-
disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DMoral_fixations_The_role_of_moral_integr.pdf 
 
